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FORMALIZING HOHFELDIAN
ANALYSIS TO CLARIFY THE
MULTIPLE SENSES OF 'LEGAL
RIGHT': A POWERFUL LENS
FOR THE ELECTRONIC AGE
LAYMAN E. ALLEN*
Careful communication is frequently of central importance in law.
The language used to communicate even with oneself in private
thought profoundly influences the quality of that effort; but when one
attempts to transmit an idea to another, language assumes even greater
significance because of the possibilities for enormously distorting the
idea. Word skill is to be prized. Few have expressed this more aptly
or succinctly than Wesley N. Hohfeld:
[I1n any closely reasoned problem, whether legal or non-legal,
chameleon-hued words are a peril both to clear thought and to
lucid expression.1
Such a proposition should not be controversial among lawyers and
legal scholars.
With the advent of the digital computer and the power of electronic
information retrieval systems, the precise usage and definition of words
* Professor of Law and Research Social Scientist, University of Michigan. A.B.
1951, Princeton University; M.P.A. 1952, Harvard University; L.L.B. 1956, Yale Uni-
versity.
This Article is a revised version of an article, written by the author, entitled
Right1 , Right2, Rights, Right4 and How About RighT?, which appeared in HUMAN
RIGHTS (E. Pollack ed.), published by Jay Stewart Publications, Inc., in 1971. The
logical systems described are essentially the same as those presented earlier, with one
exception. There are significant modifications in LSS: five rules of inference are
added to the system (RoNNRi', D2NNoD2i', D4NNoD4i', D2oD2NNi', and D4o-
D4NNi'), one new definition is added (RG()d), and the definition of 'PrivilegE' is
modified.
1. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning,
23 YA.LE L.J. 16, 29 (1913) [hereinafter cited as Hohfeld].
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rises from the level of merely aiding the efficiency of a transaction be-
tween legal entities to that of being virtually essential, where comput-
ers are involved, if the transaction is to take place at all. Man learns
by example and possesses the creativity to resolve ambiguities; while
some work has been done to achieve similar capabilities for comput-
ers, at present the machines are considerably less sophisticated than
men in taking into account the relevant features of the total context in
dealing with problems. In general, a computer requires a clearer and
more precise specification of the question to be resolved.
The purpose of this Article is to examine one phase of the legal
communication process-that of defining a legal relationship between
parties-with a view toward expressing that definition in a manner'
that will meet the requirements of discourse with a digital computer
and that will facilitate careful and precise communication wherever that
is deemed desirable. The result will not be limited either in scope or ap-
plication to computation by a computer, but rather should provide legal
draftsmen with added critical insight into verifying their own intuitions.
The discussion that follows is divided into three sections. First,
there is presented a brief hypothetical situation of some contemporary
interest, which involves many examples of the kinds of legal relation-
ships to be considered in detail subsequently. Second, the various
senses of the term 'right' distinguished by Hohfeld are considered
and related to some of the features of the hypothetical. Finally, the
bulk of the Article in the third section illustrates the manner in which
a formal definition is specified and evaluated by applying formal tech-
niques to one particular legal relationship-hopefully, clarifying in
the process one of the fundamental concepts in legal discourse, namely,
the concept denoted by the term 'right.' This task will be approached
in the spirit in which Felix S. Cohen explored such ideas2 -not asking,
What does the term 'right' really mean?
but rather,
How is it most useful to define it?
Certainly, it is still worthwhile to do what we can to make less haunt-
ing the chilling, more-than-half-century-old reminder of John Chipman
Gray:
The student of Jurisprudence is at times troubled by the thought
2. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLuM.
L. REv. 809, 824-29 (1935).
1974]
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that he is dealing not with things, but with words, that he is busy
with the shape and size of counters in a game of logornachy, but
when he fully realizes how these words have been passed and are
still being passed as money, not only by fools and on fools, but
by and on some of the acutest minds, he feels that there is work
worthy of being done, if only it can be done worthily.3
I. A HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION
Consider the following hypothetical problem: a sensitive and enlight-
ened legislator, concerned about the potential adverse implications of
the data handling capabilities of computers for individual privacy,
seeks advice in expressing his apprehensions and persuading other
members of Congress to provide safeguards against the occurrence of
intrusions upon privacy. He believes that many of his congressional
colleagues would relish the thought of emulating the founding fathers
of the nation by issuing a fundamental proclamation that reaffirms re-
spect for the rights of individuals. He thinks they will support "The
Declaration of Data Privacy."
Of what might the details of such a declaration consist with
respect to systems that maintain personal data on individuals? And
how might expression in Hohfeldian terms help clarify? The list of
concerns to be dealt with could easily become quite lengthy; the topic
is both complex and fundamentally important. For convenience in
reference the entries on such a list might be characterized as "unfair
information practices," and the function of "The Declaration of Data
Privacy" could be to prohibit such unfair information practices. It
could provide that unless there is compelling social justification oth-
erwise embodied in specific federal statutes, responsible persons of any
organization that maintains a system of personal data on individuals
must see to it that the system is operated in such a manner that no such
unfair information practices occur. To ensure compliance, individuals
whose records are involved in occurrences of unfair information prac-
tices could be accorded both compensatory and punitive damages
from the responsible persons for each occurrence. The following
might be included as unfair information practices in the operation of a
system of personal data on individuals:
1. Failing to inform an individual that a record is being
kept on him or her;
3. J. GRAY, NATURE AND SouRcEs OF THE LAW vii (1909).
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2. Failing to notify an individual that he can refuse to
provide data about himself or herself;
3. Failing, upon request from an individual, to inform
that individual of the content of a record being kept
on him or her;
4. Disclosing data on an individual in response to a sub-
poena when the subpoena does not reach such data
because it has been secured with assurances of confi-
dentiality or in the context of a confidential relation-
ship;
5. Failing to permit an individual to correct a record be-
ing kept on him or her by adding to or expunging
data from that record;
6. Failing to provide for automatic expungement of stale
data in a record;
7. Failing to prohibit access to a record on an individual
by anyone other than those to whom access had been
granted by that individual;
8. Failing to disseminate data about an individual to per-
sons or organizations to whom the individual requests
such dissemination, upon payment of a reasonable fee
for such services;
9. Failing to maintain a record of every access or use
made of a record on an individual;
10. Failing to notify an individual of every access or use
made of a record on him or her;
11. Transferring data from a record maintained on an in-
dividual to a record maintained by another organiza-
tion, or for use by another organization, without the
informed consent of the individual to whom the record
pertains;
12. Compelling an individual to supply his or her social
security number as a condition for inclusion in a data
file (e.g., to qualify for benefits);
13. Using an individual's social security number for pur-
poses of linking records;
19741
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14. Collecting data on individuals for no specified pur-
pose;
15. Collecting data on individuals, when the relevance to
the purposes for which it will be used cannot be clearly
demonstrated;
16. Failing to notify an individual of the liability of data
on him or her to disclosure by subpoena when it is lia-
ble to such disclosure;
17. Failing to maintain a suitable degree of data security;
18. Transferring data to an organization that does not
maintain a suitable degree of data security;
19. Failing to adopt a code of ethics for the employees of
the data system;
20. Failing, upon request of an individual, to specify the
authorized use to which data about that individual is
to be put and the duration for which the record is to be
maintained;
21. Using data about an individual for a purpose other
than that specified as authorized unless the individual
has indicated his or her permission of such use; and
22. Otherwise operating the data system in a way or by
means that would invade an individual's privacy.4
II. DISTINGUISHING VARIOUS SENSES OF 'RIGHT'
In his classic effort to help clarify legal discourse by specifying for it a
set of "lowest common denominators," Hohfeld indicates prior judicial
recognition that the term 'right' is used indiscriminately and ambig-
uously to denote a wide variety of legal relations.5 Sometimes 'right'
is used to indicate a privilege to do something. On other occasions
its reference is to a power to create some legal relationship. Still
other times it is used to show that someone has immunity from having
his legal status changed in some way. Usually, however, it is used
4. However, for some indication that such concerns are not entirely hypothetical,
see SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, REcORDs, COMPuTERS AND THE RiGHTS OF
CrrENS (1973).
5. Examples of 'right' used in the various senses are included. Hohfeld, supra
note 1.
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to refer to right in the strict sense of somebody else's obligation to do
something for the right-holder.6 For each of these four different
senses of 'right,' Hohfeld stipulated a different term:




Right,. The definite and appropriate meaning that Hohfeld stipu-
lated 'right' (in the strict sense of a legally enforceable claim) should
refer to is the correlative of 'duty.' He gave as example:
[If X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the former's
land, the correlative (and equivalent) is that Y is under a duty to-
-ward X to stay off the place.7
The first entry on the list of unfair information practices in "The
Declaration of Data Privacy" is an example of a violation of a right
in this first sense. However, to express the right itself in a Hoh-
feldian manner, the parties involved in the relationship must be made
explicit. Let the term 'subject' refer to the individual person upon
whom a record is maintained in a system of personal data on indi-
viduals, and let the term 'data keeper' refer to those persons responsi-
ble for the operation of such a system. Using these terms, the Hoh-
feldian right, of which the first unfair practice is a violation, can be
expressed as follows:
"A subject has a right that the data keepers of a system in-
form the subject that a record is being kept on him or her."
Each of the other 21 unfair information practices in "The Declaration
of Data Privacy" can be similarly transformed into an expression of a
right in this first Hohfeldian sense, indicating what data keepers must
do for subjects.
Both of these examples make clear that Hohfeld, in effect, speci-
fied the term 'right' to refer to a three-term relationship between two
persons and an action-the right-holder, the other party, and an act
of the other party. To say that x has a (legal) right that p shall be
done by y is the same as to say that it is obligatory -that p be done
by y for x, and that the legal system will enforce the obligation.
6. Hohfeld, supra note 1, at 31-32.
7. Id. at 32.
19741
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The statement of -this right of x can be abbreviated by the ex-
pression 'Rpyx.' To understand this abbreviation, consider a state-
ment like 'The ball is red.' This statement attributes the property
red (R) to the ball (b). An abbreviated way of writing it is 'Rb.' Just
as 'Rb' is an abbreviated way of writing 'The ball is red' or 'The
ball has the property of being red,' so too is '(Rpy)x,' or more briefly,
'Rpyx' an abbreviated way of writing 'x has the property of having a
right ,that p be done by y.'
Right2. Hohfeld emphasized the importance of distinguishing the
concept of privilege from the concept of right, and he reserved the
term 'privilege' to refer to what one person was permitted to do as far
as some other person was concerned. Continuing the prior example,
he states:
[W]hereas X has a right or claim that Y, the other man, should
stay off the land, he himself has the privilege of entering on the
land; or, in equivalent words, X does not have a duty to stay off.
The privilege of entering is the negation of a duty to stay off.8
So, 'privilege' is also, in effect, specified by 1-ohfeld to refer to a three-
term relationship between two persons and an action-the privilege-
holder, the other party, and an act of the privilege-holder. To say
that x has a (legal) privilege to do p as far as y is concerned is the
same as to say that it is permissible for p to be done as far as y is
concerned by x and that the legal system will not enforce any attempt
through litigation by y to prevent x from doing p.
The second unfair information practice in "The Declaration of
Data Privacy" has a Hohfeldian privilege embedded within the state-
ment of a violation of a right. It is the following privilege:
"A subject has a privilege with respect to the data keepers
of a system to refuse to provide data about himself or her-
self."
A subject has no duty to a data keeper to provide such data. The
legal system will not coerce or in any way deprive a subject who re-
fuses to provide such data, if a data keeper sues to compel provision
of it.
Rights. For Hohfeld 'power' is most usefully reserved to refer to
the change in legal relations that results from some "superadded fact
8. Id.
434
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or group of facts which are under the volitional control of one or more
human beings."9  The person (or persons) whose volitional control
is paramount has the (legal) power-to effect the particular change of
legal relations. He gave the following example of terminating"0 a le-
gal relation:
X, the owner of ordinary personal property "in a tangible object"
has the power to extinguish his own legal interest (rights, powers,
immunities, etc.) through that totality of operative facts known as
abandonment; and-simultaneously and correlatively--to create
in other persons privileges and powers relating to the abandoned
object,-e.g., the power to acquire title to the latter by appropriat-
ing it. Similarly, X has the power to transfer his interest to Y,-
that is, to extinguish his own interest and concomitantly create in Y
a new and corresponding interest.'"
Hence, Hohfeld's treatment of 'power' is significantly different from
the treatment of 'right' and 'privilege.' The latter pair of terms refer
to three-term relationships, while 'power' is, in effect, stipulated to re-
fer to a two-term relationship between (a) the changing of a legal
relation and (b) the power-holder. To say that x has the (legal)
power to create legal relation r is the same as to say that legal rela-
tion r does not exist now, that it is within the volitional control of x to
do p, and that if x does p then legal relation r will be created.
The third unfair information practice in "The Declaration of Data
Privacy" has a Hohfeldian power embedded within the statement of a
violation of a conditional right. It is the following power:
"A subject has the power to create a right of the subject that
the data keepers of a system inform the subject of the con-
tent of a record being kept on him or her."
A subject can exercise such a power, and thus create such a right, by
requesting that a data keeper inform the subject of the content of a
record being kept on him or her.
Right4. Hohfeld saw parallels between the right-privilege rela-
tionship and the power-immunity relationship. In his words:
9. Id. at 44.
10. Terminating a legal relation is one of the two kinds of change possible; the
other is creating a legal relation. One of the consequences of Hohfeld's stipulations
about fundamental legal conceptions is that the creation of one legal relation will
always be the termination of another, and vice versa.
11. Hohfeld, supra note 1, at 45.
19741 435
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A right is one's affirmative claim against another, and a privilege
is one's freedom from the right or claim of another. Similarly, a
power is one's affirmative "control" over a given legal relation as
against another; whereas an immunity is one's freedom from the
legal power or "control" of another as regards some legal relation.
X, a landowner, has, as we have seen, power to alienate
to Y or to any other ordinary party. On the other hand, X has
also various immunities as against Y, and all other ordinary par-
ties. For Y is under a disability (i.e., has no power) so far as
shifting the legal interest either to -himself or to a third party is con-
cerned; and what is true of Y applies similarly to every one else
who has not by virtue of special operative facts acquired a power
to alienate X's property. 12
Like the treatment of 'power,' the term 'immunity' is, in effect, treated
as referring to a two-term relationship between (a) the changing of a
legal relation and (b) the disability-holder (the person who does not
have power to change that legal relation). To Hohfeld, to say that x
has an immunity from y's control with respect to creating legal rela-
tion r would be to say (a) that legal relation r is not so now and (b)
that although it may be within the volitional control of y to do p, it is
not so that by virtue of y's doing p that legal relation r will be cre-
ated.' 3
The fourth unfair information practice in "The Declaration of
Data Privacy" has a Hohfeldian immunity embedded within the state-
ment of a violation of a right. It is the following immunity:
"The privilege of a data keeper with respect to third parties
to refuse to disclose data on a subject because the data was
secured with assurances of confidentiality or in the con-
text of a confidential relationship has an immunity of bing
terminated by issuance of a subpoena by a litigant."
Another way of stating the same idea is that no litigant has the power
to terminate a data keeper's privilege to refuse to disclose data se-
cured confidentially. It perhaps should also be pointed out that a data
keeper's privilege to not disclose such data in no way would preclude
12. Id. at 55.
13. If the concepts of power and immunity were going to be treated in detail
here (they are not), it would be useful to amend this slightly by saying that to say
that legal relation r has an immunity from y's control would be to say that (a) legal
relation r does not exist now and (b) that although it may be within the volitional
control of y to do p, it is not so that by virtue of y's doing p that legal relation r
will be create.d,
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his also having a duty to not disclose, were that judged to be wise
public policy.
The remarks above about Rights[l,2,s, 4] are slight elaborations on
what Hobfeld actually said about 'right,' 'privilege,' 'power,' and 'im-
munity,' but they are only clarifications that facilitate transition to the
discussion of a formally defined concept of right to be pursued here
and are not in any way inconsistent with Hohfeld's ideas. It is the
idea of right (in the strict sense), indicated by Hohfeld by the term
'right' and indicated here by the term 'right,,' that attention shall be
focused on here. Some considerations involved in formally defining
the concept of right will be explored, and a preliminary proposal for
defining it will be undertaken. The relationship of the proposed
defined concept of right to proposed defined concepts of privilege,
duty, and noright will be considered, but the relationships of right to
proposals that will be made in the future for defining power, immunity,
liability, and disability will not be treated here.
Hohfeld's monumental contribution in clarifying the language
available for discussing law was the precursor of legal realism.' 4  The
magnitude of his influence is revealed in the efforts of his disciples-
Walter Wheeler Cook, Arthur L. Corbin, and Karl Llewellyn-who
were among the leading lights of realism in law. Further refinement
along the lines that Hohfeld charted may well pave the way for another
major breakthrough in legal thought and practice by significantly en-
hancing the compatibility of law and computers and the usefulness
of the latter to the former in the emerging electronic age. It is to
this purpose that these preliminary efforts toward formalizing the Hoh-
feldian system of legal analysis are addressed.
Before turning to the formal definition of right, there is a prelim-
inary matter to be considered. It would be useful to have a clear
and unambiguous way of indicating the occurrence of a defined term.
A commonly-used method in legal writing is to capitalize -the first letter
of the defined term. Hence, by stipulation a Defined term (like
this one, ie., the word 'Defined') is a word whose initial letter is
capitalized. This works fine most-but not all-of the time. De-
fined terms may appear as the first words of a sentence. Then it is
not clear whether the word is:
14. For one of the best summaries and examples of careful analysis in the more
recent literature on the Hohfeldian system, see Cullison, Logical Analysis of Legal
Doctrine: The Normative Structure of Positive Law, 53 IOWA L. Rav. 1209-68 (1968).
19741
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a) being used in its Defined sense and therefore being cap-
italized for being both the initial word of a sentence
and the occurrence of a word used in a Defined sense,
or
b) being used in a sense other than its Defined sense and
therefore being capitalized only because it is the first
word of a sentence.
An alternative method for indicating a DefineD term is to capitalize
both the first and last letters of the term. DefineD terms used in
their DefineD sense would then be distinguished from those same terms
used in a sense other than their DefineD sense. This is the method
that will be used for indicating occurrences of DefineD terms in this
Article. Thus, 'RighT' will indicate an occurrence of a DefineD term.
II. FORMALIZATION OF THE HOIFELDIAN
CONCEPTS IN THE RIGHT SET
To define a term formally is to define it in terms of a formal lan-
guage, i.e., in terms of a formal logical system. In highly over-sim-
plified terms, a formal logical system is a set of symbols for which
there is specified the conditions that must be satisfied (1) for an ex-
pression in that system to be well-formed, (2) for well-formed expres-
sions to be assumed to be true, (3) for well-formed expressions to be
inferred to be true from the truth of other well-formed expressions,
and (4) for sequences of well-formed expressions to constitute a proof
that the final well-formed expression in the sequence is true.' 5
15. What has come to be regarded as the definitive characterization of what
constitutes a "logical system" was formulated by John G. Kemeny in 1948 as follows:
A 'logical system, L' is a recursive and recursively enumerable set of
symbols satisfying the following 10 conditions:
(1) The elements of the set are known as primitive symbols. One par-
ticular enumeration of the primitive symbols is chosen, and we say that in
this enumeration the primitive symbols are in their natural order.
This gives the correspondence with the natural numbers which is necessary
in order to speak of a recursive set.
(2) The set of all finite sequences of primitive symbols is the set FL.
An object is a formula of L if and only if it belongs to FL.
(3) A certain recursive subset of F, is known as WL. An object is a
well-formed formula (abbreviated w.f.f.) of L if and only if it belongs
to WL.
(4) A recursive subset of WL is known as AL. An object is an axiom
of L if and only if it belongs to AL.
(5) There is a finite set of effective rules, the set RL, whose elements
are of the form: "From C, C, ... , C (n -- 0) to infer D if D
C WL and if C1, C2, . . . , C., D satisfy the following conditions .(6) The set of all finite sequences of w.f.f. of L is known as SL.
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A. FORMAL DEFINITION OF 'RIGHT
In approaching the task of formally defining the term 'RighT,' recall
that to say (in a Hohfeldian sense) that x has a (legal) right that p
shall be done by y is the same as to say that it is obligatory that p be
done by y for x and that the legal system will enforce the obligation.
The statement 'x has a right that p shall be done by y' can be abbrevi-
ated by the expression 'RighT-pyx'. 16 Hereafter such abbreviations
will be indicated by statements such as the following:
(1) RighT-pyx =ab x has a right that p shall be
done by y.
(The '=ab' indicates that the statement on its left is equal (by ab-
breviation) to the statement on its right; similarly '=df' indicates that
the logical expression on its left is defined by the expression to the right.)
In 'RighT-pyx' the expression 'RighT' denotes a three-term rela-
tionship that exists between the state of affairs p, the person y, and
the person x. The position of a term after the relational operator indi-
cates what role that term plays in the relationship. By stipulation, in
'RighT-pyx' the first term indicates the state of affairs that some act
be done, the second term indicates the person who must do the act,
and the last required term ('RighT' is a ternary or three-term relational
operator) indicates the person for whom the act must be done. Thus,
'RighT-pyx' indicates that the state of affairs p must be brought into
existence (hereafter abbreviated as 'p must be done') by person y for
person x.
Note that to say that it is obligatory that p be done by y for x
(7) An object u belongs to the set PL if and only if:
(a) u C SL and u is not the empty sequence.
(b) Every w.f.f. of the sequence u is either an axiom of L, or it
is preceded in u by w.f.f.'s from which it can be inferred by one of
the rules in RL.
(8) An object s, is a theorem of L if and only if there is a u such that
U C PT. and s is the final w.f.f. in the sequence u. The set of all
theorems of L is known as TL.
(9) Given any primitive symbol p, there is a u such that u -C WT, and
p is one of the symbols in u.
(10) The set TL is not empty.
Kemeny, Models of Logical Systems, 13 J. SYMBOLIC Looac 16, 17 (1948).
16. More customary notation would use parentheses and express it 'RighT(pyx)'.
However, in the notation used here parentheses are being reserved for another purpose:
to indicate subordinate proofs when proofs are written in horizontal form. See note
24 infra.
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and that the legal system will enforce the obligation is the same as to
say that it is (legally) obligatory that p be done by y for x. The
various parts of the statement 'it is (legally) obligatory that p be done
by y for x' can be abbreviated as follows:
(2) 0 =ab it is (legally) obligatory that
(3) D2py =ab p is done by y
(4) D4px =ab p is done for x
(5) D24pyx =ab p is done by y for x.
Using these abbreviations the formal contextual definition of 'RighT' is
as follows:
(6) RighT-pyx -df OD24pyx.
It may be helpful in reading an expression like 'RighT-pyx' to
consider its similarity to another statement that contains a three-term
relation. Consider the three-term relation indicated by the term 'Be-
tweeN' in a statement like 'Philadelphia is between Boston and Wash-
ington.' The statement can be abbreviated as follows:
(7) BetweeN-bwp -=ab Philadelphia is between Boston
and Washington.
This abbreviation indicates that 'BetweeN' is a three-term relation that
relates the terms 'b', 'w', and 'p' just as 'RighT' is a three-term relation
that relates the terms 'p', 'y', and 'x'. Another way of looking at 'Be-
tweeN-bwp' is to regard 'BetweeN-bw' as a property (or predicate or
one-term relation) of p so that 'BetweeN-bwp' is regarded as saying that
Philadelphia (p) has the property (BetweeN-bw) of being between
Boston and Washington. Similarly, instead of regarding 'RighT' as a
three-term relation in 'RighT-pyx', we could just as well look at
'RighT-py' as a property of x so that 'RighT-pyx' would be inter-
preted as saying that x has the property (RighT-py) of having a right
that p be done by y. Hence, just as:
(8) Rb -ab The ball has the property of being
round (which is another way of say-
ing that the ball is round).
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is used in standard logical notation to indicate the property (round-
ness) is predicated on the object (the ball), so also:
(9) RighT-pyx =ab x has the property of having
a RighT-py.
This may be helpful in appreciating the rationale underlying the (seem-
ingly) peculiar order of the symbols in 'RighT-pyx' in which the
right-holder, x, appears last even thoughi in the statement 'x has a
right that p be done by y' x appears first.
Since 'RighT' in (6) is defined in terms of '0' and 'D24', a for-
mal definition of 'Right' shall be achieved only when '0' and 'D24'
have been formally defined or accepted as primitive terms. First to be
considered is the formal definition of '0', which is used to indicate the
concept of legal obligation. In the manner of Alan R. Anderson,17 '0'
shall be treated as a unary operator operating on a proposition (the idea
expressed by a sentence), rather than as operating on a class (of acts)
in the manner of Georg von Wright."
B. DEFINITION OF 'OBLIGATION' IN A FORMAL SYSTEM
There are certain properties that any adequate definition of legal obli-
gation should have. The six properties that will be considered here
are not in any sense thought to be a comprehensive list. They happen
to be six that distinguish among various formal systems that have been
formulated by logicians as possible candidates to be used for defining
the concept of obligation.
The first four properties to be considered relate -to derived rules
and propositions that are not provable (or, more precisely, should not
be provable) in a formal system that defines the concept of obligation
appropriately. A derived rule or proposition is not provable if it is
not possible to derive it by means of the axioms and rules of infer-
ence in the basis of the formal system.
The concept of legal obligation that is defined in a formal system
should (I believe, at this time) be such that it has the following six
properties:19
17. A. ANDERSON, THE FORMAL ANALYSIS OF NORMATIVE SYSTEMS 29 n.3.6
(Tech. Rep. No. 2, Contract SAR/Nonr-609, U.S.O.N.R. Group Psychology Branch,
New Haven, Conn., 1956) [hereinafter cited as ANDERSON].
18. G. von Wright, Deontic Logic, 60 MIND 1, 2 (1951).
19. What follows has been so heavily influenced by a multitude of discussions
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(P1) It is not provable in the formal system that from
'it is (legally) obligatory that p', it is valid to in-
fer 'it is (legally) obligatory that it is (legally)
obligatory that p'.




It is not provable in the formal system that from
'it is (legally) obligatory that p', it is valid to infer
'it is logically necessary (L) that it is (legally) obli-
gatory that p'.
(P3) --o 0 (if p, then p).
It is not provable in the formal system that logical
tautologies (such as, 'if p, then p') are (legally
obligatory.
(P4) p--o OPp.
It is not provable in -the formal system -that from
'p', it is valid to infer 'it is (legally) obligatory
that it is (legally) permitted that p' (where 'P' indi-
cates legal permission and 'Pp' is defined as 'not
obligatory not p').
(P5) It is provable in the formal system that 'it is (le-
gally) obligatory that if it is (legally obligatory
that p, then p is true'. (In other words, legal ob-
ligations (legally) ought to be fulfilled.)
with Alan Ross Anderson down through the years that it is difficult to separate out
all that borrows and benefits from these discussions. Suffice it to say that the
benefit and influence has been extraordinary; what is presented is my own interpreta-
tion of these dialogues in light of my own perspectives about the legal decision-
making process.
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Using '--**' to indicate provability, (P5) can be abbreviated as follows:
--** O(ifOp,thenp).
(P6) Op, O(ifp,thenq) --** Oq.
It is provable in the formal system that from 'it is
(legally) obligatory that p' and 'it is (legally) ob-
ligatory that if p, then q', it is valid to infer 'it is
(legally) obligatory that q'.
For the first four properties, it is evident and easy to illustrate
that any reasonable formal definition of the concept of legal obliga-
tion should result in the non-provability statements (P1)-(P4). If
instead of (P1), it is provable that 'OOp' can be validly inferred from
'Op? (i.e., Op --** OOp), then from a statement such as:
(10) It is obligatory now that Michigan residents with
earnings of $10,000 file a state income tax state-
ment.
it would be possible to prove as a matter of logic:
(11) It is obligatory that (10).
In other words,
(11') It is obligatory that it is obligatory now that Mich-
igan residents with earnings of $10,000 file a state
income tax statement.
Should the concept of legal obligation be so defined that just be-
cause (10) happens to be true, that as a matter of -logic it is provable that
(11) is true-in effect, that it is (legally) obligatory that Michigan
have a state income tax? Certainly not! Although it is certainly
true that it is (legally) permitted that Michigan have a state income
tax, it is just as true that it is also (legally) permitted that Michigan
not have a state income tax. In fact, in 1960 it did not have such a
tax, while in 1968 it did-and both were (legally) permitted. Fur-
thermore, if the Michigan legislature wishes to terminate this tax, it
certainly has the legal power to do so. Hence, just because (10) hap-
pens to be true, we would not want to define the concept of legal obli-
gation in such a way that it is therefore legally obligatory for (10) to
be true.
1974]
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The argument in favor of (P2), rather than Op --** LOp, is
similar.
Should the concept of legal obligation be so defined that just be-
cause (10) happens to be true, it can be logically proved that:
(12) It is logically necessary that (10)?
Again, the answer is: Certainly not! If it were necessary as a matter
of logic that (10) be true, then it would be, in effect, logically impos-
sible for Michigan not to have a state income tax. That is clearly ab-
surd. As a matter of fact, until very recently Michigan has not had
such a tax.
To argue the concept of legal obligation should be so defined
that --** O(if p, then p), rather than P3, is -the same as asserting
that for (if p, then p) not -to be so is a violation of the law. There is
not a single statute, constitutional provision, regulation, or other
(legal) normative command that (to my knowledge) so provides. If
tautologies 'were universally obligatory (legally) as a matter of logic,
then there certainly should be more indications of it in (legal) nor-
mative commands. As a matter of fact, it would seem to be the ex-
treme of redundancy for legislatures to spend their time commanding
that logical truths be so. If a proposition about the state of affairs
is, in fact, logically true, then it would be impossible for it to be oth-
erwise. Such an obligation would be one that would be impossible
to violate. And what kind of obligation would that be? Certainly it
would not be one that would likely have much effect upon human
behavior, if that is what legal norms are intended to do. It seems clearly
more desirable -to so define -the concept of legal obligation that (P3) is
the case, that is, so that it is not (logically) provable that tautologies are
(legally) obligatory.
Finally, with respect to the fourth non-1rovable statement involv-
ing the concept of legal obligation-namely, (P4)-it would be
strange beyond belief for obligation (of any kind, legal included) to be
defined otherwise. To contend that p --** OPp is to contend that it
is against the law for anything that is, in fact, done to be forbidden
by the law. This would forbid the legislature (as a matter of logic)
from commanding or prohibiting any kind of human behavior. To
deny (4) would just be too bizarre to consider 5eriously.
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The final pair of properties that should be among the minimum
prerequisites of any adequate definition of legal obligation involve
statements of provability about expressions involving legal obligation.
Unlike the first four, these cannot be justified by merely giving coun-
ter-examples. To argue for (P5) is to contend that as a matter of
logic it should be provable that there is a violation of the law if it
is not so that if Op then p. Notice that this contention is quite dif-
ferent from saying that if Op then p. The latter is saying that every-
thing that is obligatory is, in fact, done. Alternatively, to say that if
Op then p is to say that there are no violations of law. That is
clearly not so, and nobody would seriously so contend. All that '0 (if
Op, then p)' asserts is that '(if Op, then p)' should, as a matter of
law, be so; it does not assert that it is, in fact, so. Another way of put-
ting it would be to say that the concept of legal obligation should be
so defined that if there is no violation of the legal command that legal
norms should be fulfilled, then the legal norms, in fact, have been ful-
filled. It would be strange to define legal obligation so that this
would be otherwise. To do so would be to accept the possibility that
there could be a violation of some legal obligation, but this violation
would not be a violation of an obligation that legal obligations be ful-
filled.
Finally, to argue for 'Op, 0 (if p, then q) --o Oq', rather than
(P6) is to maintain that it should be logically possible for there to be
an obligation that p and an obligation that if p then q, and despite this
pair of obligations, for 'q' not to be so without violating the legal sys-
tem. That this is (logically) unreasonable is apparent from a con-
sideration of the two possible situations: (a) p and not q, and (b) not
p and not q. These are the only possible situations where 'q' is not
so, and both clearly lead to a violation. In situation (a), it must be
the case that 'not (if p then q)', because 'q' follows from 'p' and
'if p then q'. Therefore, the second obligation would be violated,
and hence there would be a violation of one of the norms of the legal
system, namely, 'Q(if p then q)'. In situation (b), the first obliga-
tion, namely, 'Op', is violated, and hence there is a violation of one of
the norms of the legal system. Since in all cases, 'not q' leads to a vio-
lation of the legal system, by definition, it is obligatory that q.
By means of these six criteria we shall be able to distinguish from
eight different formal systems of logic the one that leads to the most
adequate definition of legal obligation in the sense that it has all six
properties. But before considering the first formal system, we should
1974]
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examine in closer detail what is meant by the expression 'it is (legally)
obligatory that'. It can be contextually defined as follows:
(13) Op =df If not p, then there is a violation.
Thus, in some of the systems that will be considered here, 'It is obli-
gatory thaT' is defined in terms of 'if-then', 'not', and 'violation', which
in turn will be defined in the formal system. The concept of violation
is defined in terms of the particular individual violations of particu-
lar legal norms of the legal system.
(14) V =ab There is a violation.
It will be the concept that links the formal system realistically to the
legal system. Operationally in real world experience when there is a
particular individual violation, if the matter is appropriately brought
to the attention of the authorized community decisionmakers, they
will bring the resources of the community to bear in pressuring the vi-
olator .2  For example, in terms of "The Declaration of Data Privacy" a
violation occurs each time one of the listed unfair information practices
happens. However, the community enforcement machinery is set in mo-
tion when a subject whose right has been violated brings the violation
to the attention of the authorized decisionmakers. Only then will
the official enforcement procedure of the community be brought to
bear on the violator.
1. Logical System LS1
The first logical system to be considered as a possible candidate for
use in defining '0' is the ordinary two-valued propositional logic, here
called LS1. LS1 is formulated in the subordinate-proof style of Fred-
eric Fitch2 and in the parenthesis-free notation of Jan Lukasiew-
icz,11 as are the other seven systems to be considered. The 'if-then'
formalized in LS1 is material implication and is represented by the
connective 'C' and treated as a propositional operator. Negation is rep-
resented by the connective 'N'. Using these, 'It is obligatory thaT'
20. It should also be noted that 'V', in indicating a violation in the sense of a
violation of the legal system of norms, rather than the violation of a particular norm,
is exactly like Anderson's 'S' (disjunction of all sanctions); 'V' is the disjunction of
all particular violations (V1, V 2 .... Vn). See note 17 supra.
21. F. FITCH, SYMBOLIC LoGic: AN INTRODuCTION 20-63 (1952).
22, I. Copi, Siy0oic Loic 264-65 (3d ed, 1967).
HeinOnline  -- 48 S. Cal. L. Rev. 446 1974-1975
LEGAL RIGHT
(hereafter abbreviated 'ObligatioN') is defined in the following con-
textual definition:
Ow -df CNwV.
('It is obligatory thaT w' is equal to by defini-
tion 'If not w, then -there is a violation (i.e.,
V)'1.)
The interpretations 3 in English prose given here to each of the










if and only if
and
not
LS1 can be formulated by the following alphabet, formation rules,













If a formula is
WFF.
p q r s s5 s6 . . .
V1 V 2 V 8 . .
CKN
e f f8 f4 . . .
u V W W4 W5 . . .
a variable or a constant, then it is a
If formulas e and f are WFFs, then
(a) so are Kef and Cef, and
(b) so is Nf.
(15) Od:
23. It should be emphasized that the connective 'C' is only an approximation
of what is meant by 'if-then' in English prose. While 'Cpq' would be read 'If p,
then q', 'Cpq' is still a true statement if 'p' is false and 'q' is true.
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FR3 If a formula is not a WFF by virtue of one of the





Kvw --* v, w.
(From the K-WFF 'Kvw',
valid to infer the WFF 'v'
to infer the WFF 'w'.)
v, w --* Kvw.
(From the WFFs 'v' and
be valid to infer 'Kvw'.)
it is assumed to be
and also to be valid
'w', it is assumed to
TR3 Co:
TR4 Ci:
Cvw, V --* W.
(From the C-WFF 'Cvw' and its antecedent
WFF 'v', it is assumed to be valid to infer its
consequent WFF 'w'.)
(v: . .. w) -* 'Cvw.
(From the derivability, in a subordinate proof
of 'w', given that 'v' is assumed to be true, it
is assumed to be valid to infer 'Cvw'.)
In the statement of the Ci Rule in the horizontal style, the parentheses
are used to indicate, a subordinate proof. In the vertical style used by






w--* (v: ... w).
(From 'w', it is assumed to be valid to infer
'w' in a subordinate proof in which 'v' is a
supposition.)
(Nv: . . . w, Nw) -- * v.
(From the derivability in a subordinate proof
of 'w' and 'Nw', given that 'Nv' is assumed to
be true, it is assumed to be valid to infer 'v'.)
Statement of Rule
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DEFINITIONS
D1 Ad: Avw =df NKNvNw
('v or v' is equal to by definition 'it is not so
that (not v and not w)'.)
D2 Ed: Evw =df KCvwCwv.
('v is equivalent to w' is equal to by definition
'if v then w, and if w then v'.)
D3 Vd: V =df AA ... AV1 V2 ... V.+i.
n
('V' is equal to by definition the disjunction of
all the violations of a legal system that there
can be, that is, if 'V' is true then there is at
least one violation of the legal system.)
In LS1 so formulated, it is provable that 'C-NCNpV-V' can be
inferred from 'CNpV'.24 Since 'Ow' is 'CNwV', the following is the
24.
DRI I CNpV -** C-NCNpV-V
1 CNpV s
2 a NCNpV s





The various parts of the above tabulation of statement and proof of derived rule
#1 (DRI), are specified below:
Name of the theorem Statement of the theorem
or derived rule. or derived rule.
ITEMIZATION The The
of proof justification





In the complete tabulation, the proofs and their justifications are written in vertical
form. Both the proofs and their justifications can be written in somewhat abbreviated
horizontal forms that are here referred to as proof sketches and justification sketches.
The complete tabulation of the proof of a derived rule or theorem can easily be re-
constructed from either a proof sketch or a justification sketch, The proof sketch of
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case: Op -- ** OOp.25  Hence, (P1) is not fulfilled in LS1. Similarly,
it can be shown that in LSl (P3) is not fulfilled (because --** C-NCpp-
V, and hence, --** OCpp) 20 and also that, where the definition of
DRi is:
CNpV: (NCNpV: (NV: CpNVNCNpV),V),C-NCNpV-V
the justification sketch of DRi is:
s: (s: (s:RR,R),No),Ci
The sketches are merely abbreviated, horizontally-written versions of proofs and justifi-
cations, which are customarily written in vertical form.
Hereafter, in this Article justification sketches will be used frequently to support
the assertions in the text because of the conciseness that can be achieved by doing so.
25.









DR2: Op -** OOp
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'Pw' is 'NONw, (P4) is not fulfilled (because p --** C-NNCNNpV-V,
and hence, p --** OPp)." This leads to the conclusion that '0' as
defined is not adequately formalized in LS1 because the definition of
'V' in this system does have the first, third, and fourth properties that
an adequate definition of legal obligation should, as a minimum, have.
The concept of obligation defined in LS1 would, however, be adequate
with respect to (P2), (P5), and (P6).
2. Logical System LS2
The efforts by logicians to formalize more adequately the concept of
'if-then' have led to consideration of the systems of logic, sometimes re-
27. The following 24 derived rules of LS1 will be helpful in simplifying the
proof of theorems and other derived rules of LS1 or any system that includes LS1.
For readers who wish to examine complete proofs of these rules, see Layman E. Allen,
WFF 'N PROOF: The Game of Modem Logic, (1970 Edition). Several of them
are used in the proof of DR3 and DR4.
1. Rp: w -** w [s: (s:R),Ci,Co]
2. NNo: NNw -** w Es:(s:RpR),Nol
3. NNi: w -** NNw [s:(s:R,NNo),No]
4. Ni: (w: . . . vNv) -** Nw [s:Ci,Ci,(s:NNo,R,R,Co,Co),No]
5. Ai: v -** AvwAwv [s:(s:R,Ko),(s:R,Ko),Ni,Ni,Ad,Adl
6. CoNo: CvwNV -** w [s,s:(s:R,Co,R),Ni]
7. Ao: Avw, (v: . .. u),(w: . .. u) [s,ss:Ci,Ci,(s:R,CoNo,R,CoNo,
-** u Ki,Ad),No]
8. AoCi: Avw -** CNvw [s: (s:R,(s: (s:R,RR),No),(s:Rp),Ao),Ci]
9. NAo: NAvw -** NvNw [s: (s:AiR),(s:Ai,R),NiNi]
10. CoAl: Cvw -** ANvw [s: (s:NAo,NNo,R,CoNAo),Nol
11. NAoKi: NAvw -** KNvNw [s:NAoNAo,Ki]
12. KoNAi: Kvw-* NANvNw [s: (s:KoNNi,RKoNNi,KiAd),Ni]
13. KoNCi: Kvw -** NCvNw [s:(s:Ko,Ko,Co),Nil
14. NCo: NCvw -* v,Nw [s:(s:(s:(s:R,RR),No),CiR),No,(s: (s:R),Ci,R),Ni]
15. NCoKi: NCvw-** KvNw [s:NCoNCoKi]16. NKoCi: NKvw-* CvNw Es: (s: (s:R,Ki,RR),Ni),Ci]
17. CoNKi: Cvw -** NKvNw [s: (s:Ko,R,Co,Ko),Nil
18. AoAi: Avw -** Awv [s:(s:Ai),(s:Ai),Ao]
19. KoKi: Kvw -** Kwv s:KoKo,Ki]
20. CoCi: Cvw -** CNwNv [s: (s: (s:RR,CoR),Ni),Co]
21. AoNo: Avw,Nv -** w [s,s:AoCi,Co]
22. Eo: Evw -** CvwCwv [s:Ed,KoKo]
23. Ei: CvwCwv -** Evw [ss:KiEd]
24. EoEi: Evw -** Ewv [s:Eo,Eo,Ei]
DR3 I p -** C-NNCNNpV-V
1 p S
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ferred to as "modal" logic (or more precisely as "alethic" logic). Here
we shall consider the possibilities of defining '0' in two of the standard
systems of alethic logic-the one called System M and the one called
System S4.28 The 'if-then' concept of Systems M and S4 is usually
called "strict" or "logically necessary" implication in contrast to the
"material" implication of LSL. In these two systems, -the concept of
"logical necessity" is here indicated by the symbol 'L'. The expression
'LCpq' will be read as 'p necessarily implies q' and will represent a dif-
ferent sense of 'if p then q' than is represented by 'Cpq' in LS1.
In System M, it is possible to prove everything that is provable in
LSl; in addition, some further theorems can be proved. When two
systems are related in this way, the system in which more theorems are
provable is called an "extension" of the other system. Hence, M is an
extension of LS1. There is a sense in which LS1 is included in M, i.e.,
a sense in which M can be built upon the set of assumptions that con-
stitute the formulation of LSL. Here M will be formulated as those
assumptions (alphabet, formation rules, transformation rules, and defini-
tions) of LS1 plus some additional ones. The additional ones are as
follows:
DR4 I p -** OPp
1 p S
2 a NPp s











DR3. p -* C-NNCNNpV-V [s: (s:NNo,R,NNi,Co),Ci]
DR4. p -** OPp Es: (s: (s:Pd,R),No,Od,NNi,R, DR3,Co),Ci,Od]
28. See G. VON WRhGirl, AN EssAy iN MODAL LooIC 84-90 (1951).












(From 'w is true necessarily as a matter
of logic' it is assumed to be valid to
infer 'w'.)
L( ... w) --* Lw.
(From an L-restricted subordinate proof
that has 'w" as an item, it is assumed to
be valid to infer 'Lw'.)
For purposes of LS2, an L-restricted subordinate proof is one that only
L-WFFs can be reiterated into. Reiteration into L-restricted subordi-
nate proofs is done by means of TR9, which is similar to the R rule of
LS1. Both are referred to as reiteration rules-TR5 for reiterating





Lw --* L(V: ... w), L( ... w).
(From 'Lw', it is assumed to be valid
to infer 'w' in an. L-testricted subordi-
nate proof in which 'v' is a supposition,
and it is assumed to be valid to infer
'w' in an L-restricted subordinate proof
in which there are no suppositions.)
Mw =df NLNw.
('It is possible that w' is equal to by
definition 'it is not so. that it is logically
necessary that not w'.)
System LS2 is an extension of M2 obtained by adding the follow-
ing axiom and definitions to M:
29. However, LS2 need not be formulated as an extension of M; it can be
formulated within M by a set of definitions alone, i.e., without the axiom. See
Anderson, supra note 16, at 41-46.
1974]
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Al MNVa: MNV
(It is logically possible that there is no
violation.)
D5 Od: Ow =df LC-Nw-V.
('Ow' is equal to by definition 'LC-
Nw-V', which when interpreted is: 'it
is obligatory that w' is equal to 'if not
w, then there is a violation'.)
D6 Pd: Pw =df NONw.
('Pw' is equal to by definition 'NONw',
which when interpreted is: 'it is per-
mitted that w' is equal to 'it is not ob-
ligatory that not w'.)
In LS2 so formulated with 'Ow' so defined, it can be ascertained
that the following is the case:
(16) --** OLCpp80
(17) -o OLC-Op-p.31
Hence, neither (P3) nor (P5) is fulfilled in LS2, and thus '0' is
not adequately formalized in this system.
30.
T3/LS2 I - OLCpp
1 La 1 NLCpp 8
2 a NV s









31. Constructing a proof of nonprovability is usually considerably more complex
than constructing a proof of provability, and this case is no exception. For an ex-
ample of methods for proving (17) in system M and its deontic extension, see ANDna-
soN, supra note 17, at 43-45.
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3. Logical System LS3
System S4 is a system of alethic logic that is an extension of M. It
can be formulated by merely replacing TR9 of M by the following
slightly stronger rule for reiterating into L-restricted subordinate proofs:
TRIO LoL(L)i: Lw --* L(v: .. . Lw), L( ... Lw).
(From 'Lw" it is assumed to be valid to
infer 'Lw' in an L-restricted subordi-
nate proof in which 'v' is a supposition,
and it is assumed to be valid to infer
'Lw' in an L-restricted subordinate
proof in which there are no supposi-
tions.)
LS3 is an extension of S4, and it is also an extension of LS2.
LS3 can be obtained by adding axiom Al and definitions D5 and D6
to S4; or alternatively, it can be obtained by replacing TR9 in LS2
by TRIO. In LS3 so formulated with 'Ow' so defined, it can be ascer-
tained that not only are (16) and (17) the case but also the following:
(18) Op-** OOp.32
(19) Op--** LOp.33
32. The proof of (16) in LS3 is TI, the same as in LS2. The proof of (17)
in system S4 and its deontic extension, LS3 (i.e., that the proposition is nonprovable
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Hence, not only (P3) and (P5) but also (P1) and (P2) fail to be
fulfilled in LS3, and thus '0' is not adequately formalized in this system
either.
4. Logical System LS4
Frederic Fitch has formulated a system that is an extension of S4.34
Instead of defining '0' in terms of 'LC' and 'V' (as in LS2 and LS3),








(From an 0-restricted subordinate
proof that has 'w' as an item, it is as-
sumed to be valid to infer 'OVw.)
O(Ow--* w).
(Within an 0-restricted subordinate
proof, from 'OV' it is assumed to be
valid to infer 'w'.)
Ov, ONv --* w.
(From 'Ov' and 'ONv', it is assumed
to be valid to infer 'w'.)
Ow --* O(v:...Ow), O( ... Ow).
(From 'Ow', it is assumed to be valid
to infer 'Ow' in an 0-restricted sub-
ordinate proof in which 'v' is a sup-
position, and it is assumed to be valid
to infer 'Ow' in an 0-restricted sub-
ordinate proof in which there are no
suppositions.)
The result when these four rules are added to S4 is System F(S4) (here
called LS4). So formulated, LS4 is just like LS3 with respect to the
six properties being considered here of an adequate definition of legal
obligation, except that (P2) is fulfilled for LS4 while it is not for
L3.3 5
34. Fitch, Natural Deduction Rules for Obligation, 29 J. SYMBOLIC LOGIC 150
(1964) and 3 AM. PIL. Q. 1 (1966).
35. The provability of DR7 and T4 in LS4 are shown below, but the evidence
for 'Op -o LOp' and '--oOLCOpp' is only the empirical kind mentioned in note 39.
456
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5. Logical System LS5
When TRll-TR13 and TR15 (a weaker reiteration rule for '0' that
resembles the weaker reiteration rule for 'L' in System M) are added to
System M, the resulting system is System F(M) (here called LS5).
TR15 OoO()i: Ow --* O(v: ... w), O (... w).
(From 'Ov it is assumed to be valid
to infer 'w' in an O-restricted subordi-
nate proof in which 'v' is a supposition,
and it is assumed to be valid to infer
'w' in an O-restricted subordinate proof
in which there are no suppositions.)
LS5 is exactly like LS2 with respect to the six properties being
considered: neither (P3) nor (P5) is fulfilled, but the other four are.
Clearly, in the five systems considered so far, the troublesome prop-
erties are (P3) and (P5). In none of the five systems is (P3) fulfilled,
and (P5) is fulfilled only in LSl. Next to be examined is a system that
comes to grips with (P3), the most pervasive difficulty.
6. Logical System LS6
An approach to formulating logical systems developed by Anderson in
collaboration with Nuel D. Belnap36 has led to the desired result with
respect to (P3). In one of the Anderson-Belnap systems there is speci-
fied a formalization of 'if-then' that more closely approximates its
meaning in English prose, i.e., that the consequent somehow logically
DR7/LS4 I Op -** OOp
I Op s
2 Oa I Op 1,OoO(O)i
3 op 2,o()oOi
T4/LS4 I -** OLCpp










of Entailment, 27 J. SYMOLIC
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follows from and is dependent upon the antecedent. In System E87
when it is asserted that the following is true:
(20) if p then q
(that is, 'p entails q', or in notation 'Tpq'.)
two conditions are required to be fulfilled that, for example, need not
necessarily be fulfilled with respect to 'Cpq' of LS1:
(21) the truth of 'q' follows from the truth of 'p',
and
(22) the truth of 'q' is dependent upon the truth of 'p'.
What these two requirements of relevance and dependence preclude
are the provability in E of such -things as 'T-p-Trr' and 'T-p-Trp',
whereas in LS1 'C-p-Crr' and 'C-p-Crp' are provable. With respect to
'T-p-Trr', (22) is not fulfilled because the truth of 'Trr' is not dependent
upon the truth of 'p'. On the other hand, with respect to 'T-p-Trp'
(21) is not fulfilled because if 'Trp' follows from the truth of 'p', then
when 'p' is true so is 'Trp'. This, in turn, means that when 'p' is true
the two requirements must be fulfilled for the 'r' and 'p' of 'Trp' for
'Trp' to be true. But when 'p' is true for empirical reasons, for ex-
ample, the truth of 'p' in 'Trp' does not follow from the truth of 'r'
(leaving (21) not fulfilled), and it is not dependent upon the truth of
'r' (leaving (22) not fulfilled). Hence, (21) is not always fulfilled
for 'T-p-Trp'.
If the 'LC' of LS2, LS3, LS4, and LS5 is interpreted as entail-
ment, the restrictions upon reiteration into L-restricted subordinate
proofs constrain the systems so that 'LC-p-LCqp' is not provable; there-
fore, requirement (21) is fulfilled. However, (22) is not fulfilled in
these systems, because 'LC-p-LCrr' is provable. Anderson builds (22)
into LS6 by specifying a subscript notation for keeping track of all the
suppositions actually used in deducing and restricting the entailment-
in rule-i.e., TooTi-so that only if supposition 'w' is used in deduc-
ing 'v', will it be valid to infer that 'Twv' follows from a proof of 'v',
given 'w'.18 Requirement (21) is built into LS6 the same way that it
is in LS2, LS3, LS4, and LS5-by restrictions upon reiteration into
restricted subordinate proofs.
37. A. ANDERSON, COMPLETENESS THEOREMS FOR THE SYSTEMS E OF ENTAIL-
mENT AND EQ OF ENTAILMENT wrrH QUA-IPICATION (Tech. Rep. No. 6, Office of
Naval Research Contract No. SAR/Nonr-609(16), New Haven, Conn., 1959).
38. Id.
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The set of assumptions for formulating a logical system is called






















e f f f ...
U V W W4 W5
FORMATION R ULES
FRI If a formula is a sentence variable or a constant, -then
it is a WFF.
FR2 If formulas e and f are WFFs, then
(a) so are Kef, Tef, and Aef, and
(b) so is Nf.
FR3 If a formula is not a WFF by virtue of one of the
above rules, then it is not a WFF.
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TRANSFORMATION RuLFs
Name of Rule Statement of Rule
Ko': Kvwa --* va, wa.
where 'a' indicates the set of numerical
subscripts on 'Kvw' that is carried along
to 'v' and 'w'. (From 'Kvwa' (i.e., 'v
and w'), it is assumed to be valid to
infer 'va' and to be valid to infer
'Wa'.)
Ki': v., Wa --* KVw..
where 'a' indicates that the set of nu-
merical subscripts on 'v' and 'w' must
be identical and that the same set of
subscripts is carried along to 'Kvw'.
(From 'va' and 'w', it is assumed to
be valid to infer 'Kvwa' (i.e., 'v andW').)
To': TVWa, Vb --* WaM.
where 'a' and 'b' indicate that the sets
of numerical subscripts on 'Tvw' and
'v' may be different and 'aUb' indicates
that the set of subscripts carried along
to 'w' is -the logical sum of 'a' and 'b'.
(From 'Tvwa' (i.e., 'v entails w') and
'vb', it is assumed to be valid to infer
'WaUb'.)
T(oTi': T(vm: ... wa) --* Tvwa-[ii.
where '[i]' indicates a numerical sub-
script assigned to supposition 'v' which
is distinct from the numerical sub-
script assigned to any other supposi-
tion, 'a' is a set of subscripts which
contains '[i]', and 'a-[i]' is a set of sub-
scripts comprised of those in 'a' with
'[i]' deleted. (From the derivability in
a T-restricted subordinate proof, of
'wa', given that 'vru' is assumed to be
true, it is assumed to be valid to infer
'Tv a-[' (i.e., 'v entails w').)
ToT(T)i': TUv. --* T(w-w: ... Tuva),
T( ... Tuva).
where 'a' indicates the set of numerical
subscripts on 'Tuv' that is carried along
upon reiteration into a T-restricted
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subordinate proof and '[i]' indicates a
numerical subscript assigned to sup-
position 'w' which is distinct from the
numerical subscript assigned to any
other supposition. (From 'Tuva' (i.e.,
'u entails v'), it is assumed to be valid
in a T-restricted subordinate proof to
infer 'Tuva', given that 'wwi' is as-
sumed to be true, and it is assumed to
be valid in a T-restricted subordinate
proof to infer 'Tuva'.)
Rp': Wa -- * Wa.
(From 'w', it is assumed to be valid
to infer 'w'.)
AoNKi': Avw. --* NKNvNwa.
(From 'Avwa' (i.e., 'v or w'), it is as-
sumed to be valid to infer 'NKNvNw.'
(i.e., 'not (not v and not w)'.)
NKoAi': NKNvNwa--* Avwa.
(From 'NKNvNwa' (i.e., 'not (not v
and not w)'), it is assumed to be
valid to infer 'Avwa' (i.e., 'v or w').)
KoAi2': KuAvwa --* AKuvwa.
(From 'KuAvwa' (i.e., 'u and (v or
w)'), it is assumed to be valid to infer
'AKuvwa' (i.e., '(u and v) or w').)
ToNo': Tvwa, Nwb --* Nvaub.
where 'a and 'b indicate that the sets
of numerical subscripts on 'Tvw' and
'Nw' may be different and 'aUb' indi-
cates that the set of subscripts carried
along to 'Nv' is the logical sum of 'a'
and 'b'. (From 'Tvwa' (i.e., 'v entails
w') and 'Nwb' (i.e., 'not w'), it is as-
sumed to be valid to infer 'Nvaub' (i.e.,
'not vy).)
T(oNi': T(vw: ... Wa, NWb) -- * Nvaub-[ii.
where 'a' and 'b indicate that the sets
of numerical subscripts on 'w' and
'Nw' may be different, '[i]' indicates a
numerical subscript assigned to suppo-
19741
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sition 'v' which is distinct from the
numerical subscript assigned to any
other supposition and is contained in
both 'a' and 'b', and 'aUb-[i]' indicates
that the set of subscripts carried along
to 'Nv' is comprised of those in 'aUb'
with '[i]' deleted. (From the deriva-
bility in a T-restricted subordinate
proof of 'wa' and 'Nwb', given that 'v'
is assumed to be true, it is assumed
to be valid to infer 'Nvarn-m'.)
NNi': Wa --* NNwa.
(From 'wa', it is assumed to be valid
to infer 'NNwa' i.e., 'not not w').)
NNo': NNWa --* Wa.
(From 'NNwa' (i.e., 'not not w'), 'it
is assumed to be valid to infer 'w'.)
The following tabulated summary of a proof of the transivity of 'T'
(entailment) illustrates a proof in System E.
ToToTi' I Tpqi, Tqr2 --** Tpr2
1 Tpq s
2 Tqr2 S






Several things about the proof of ToToTi' should be noted:
(a) Each supposition is assigned a unique numerical subscript
(items 1, 2, and 3a).
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(b) When 'q' is inferred from 'Tpq' and 'p' as item 3c, their
subscripts, 1 and 3, respectively, are carried along to 'q'.
Similarly, for item 3e.
(c) When 'Tpr' is inferred as item 4 from the proof of 'r', given
'p' as a supposition, the 3-subscript of 'p' is contained in
the 123-subscript of 'r', and the 12-subscript of 'Tpr' is the
result of deleting 3 from 123.
A typographically more convenient as well as more perspicuous sum-
mary tabulation for checking purposes results if subscripts are elevated
to the line-level of the WFF and listed in a column between -the proof
and its justification, as in the following tabulation of a proof:
-*::*T-TpTqr-TKpqr
1 Ta TpTqr 1 s
b Ti Kpq 2 s
2 TpTqr 1 aToT(T)i'
3 p 2 1,Ko'
4 Tqr 12 2,3,To'
5 q 2 1,Ko'
6 r 12 4,5,To'
c TKpqr 1 b,T () oTi'
2 T-TpTqr-TKpqr - 1,TOoTi'
The 'if-then' (represented by 'T') formalized in System E thus
formulated permits formalization of a concept of legal obligation that
does fulfill (P3). The following set of transformation rules, axioms,
and definitions, along with those for E, form the basis for LS6, within
which '0' is defined.
L()oLi': L( ... w) -* Lwa.
(From an L-restricted subordinate
proof that has 'w.' as an item that is
not a supposition, it is assumed to be
valid to infer 'Lwa' (i.e., 'it is logically
necessary that w').)
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LoL(L)i': Lwa --* L(vw: ... Lwa),
L(...Lwa).
where 'a' indicates the set of numerical
subscripts on 'Lw' that is carried along
upon reiteration into an L-restricted
subordinate proof and '[i]' indicates a
numerical subscript assigned to suppo-
sition 'v' which is distinct from the nu-
merical subscript assigned to any other
supposition. (From 'Lwa' (i.e., 'it is
logically necessary that w'), it is as-
sumed to be valid in an L-restricted
subordinate proof to infer 'Lwa', given
that 'vti]' is assumed to be true, and it
is assumed to be valid in an L-restricted
subordinate proof to infer 'Lwa'.)
Lo': Lw. --* W.
(From 'Lwa' (i.e., 'it is logically neces-




(It is logically possible that there is
no violation.)
DEFINITIONS
Vd: V =df AA... AV1V2 ... Vn+.
('There is a violation' is equal to by
definition 'there is a violation of par-
ticular legal norm #1 or there is a
violation of particular legal norm #2,
. . . , or there is a violation of par-
ticular legal norm # (n+ 1)', where
there are just n+1 norms in the legal
system.)
Md: Mw =df NLNw.
('It is logically possible that w' is equal
to by definition 'it is not so that it is
logically necessary that not w'.)
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Od: Ow =df TNwV.
('It is obligatory that w' is equal to by
definition 'not w entails there is a vio-
lation'.)
Pd: Pw -df NONw.
('It is permitted that w' is equal to by
definition 'it is not so that it is obliga-
tory that not w'.)
The concept of if-then formalized by 'T' in LS6, when used to
relate the forbidden act to the violation in the definition of legal obliga-
tion, leads to the following:
(23) --o OTpp.
This means that (P3) is fulfilled for the '0' of LS6. Unhappily, how-
ever, the following are also the case:
(24) Op --** LOp.3 9
(25) --o OTOpp.
These mean that (P2) and (P5) are not fulfilled in LS6. Happily,
however, both of these can be remedied if '0' is defined in terms of a
still different concept of if-then, which is explored in the next logical
system to be considered here.
39.
DR8/LS61 Op, -** LOp1
1 Op 1 s
2 TNpV 1 1,Od
3 LWNpV 1 2,Td(See LS7)
4 La LWNpV 1 3,LoL(L)i'
b TNpV I aTd
c Op 1 bOd
5 LOp 1 4,L~oLi'
The author does not know of the existence of any decision procedures for proving
(23) and (25) in LS6 (i.e., proving '-o OTpp' and '-o OTOpp'). The evidence in
support of the assertions is merely empirical-namely, that analysts familiar with the
system are unable to demonstrate the provability of 'OTpp' and 'OTOpp'.
1974] ,465
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7. Logical System LS7
The entailment concept of if-then formalized in LS6 requires both rele-
vance and dependence. In LS7 there is introduced a weak implication
('W') concept of if-then, which has the same relevance requirement as
entailment, but -a slightly weaker dependence requirement. If legal
obligation is defined in terms of a weak implication relation between
the forbidden state of affairs and the violation, the non-fulfillment of
(P2) and (P5) are remedied, but -another problem results.
The basis for LS7 can be obtained by making the following
changes in LS6:
1. Replace the 'T' in the alphabet by 'W.
2. Replace the 'Tef' in FR2 by 'Wef'.
3. Replace the transformation rules:
To', TooTi', ToT(T)i', ToNo', and
T()oNi'
by the transformation rules:
Wo', WooWi', WOi', WoNo', and
W ( ) oNi'
shown below.
Wo': WVWa Vb -- * WaUb.
(From 'Wvwa' (i.e., 'v weakly implies
w') and 'vb, it is assumed to be valid
to infer 'WGub'.)
W()owr: W(vm13: ... W.) -- * Wvwo-[1].
where [i] is in a. (From the deriva-
bility in a W-restricted subordinate
proof of 'w.', given that 'v[j' is as-
sumed to be true, it is assumed to be
valid to infer 'Wvwa-[,i' (i.e., 'v weakly
implies w').)
W()i': w. --* W(v(,]: ... w.), W (...w).
(From 'wa', it is assumed to be valid
in a W-restricted subordinate proof to
infer 'wa', given that 'vmij' is assumed
to Tbe true, and it is assumed to be
valid in a W-restricted subordinate
proof to infer 'w.'.)
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WoNo': Wvwa, NWb -- * NVaub.
(From 'Wvw.' (i.e., 'v weakly implies
w') and 'Nwb', it is assumed to be valid
to infer 'Nva'.)
WOoNi': W(vm: . .. w., Nwb) --* NVaUb-[].
where [i] is in both a and b. (From
the derivability in a W-restricted sub-
ordinate proof of 'wa' and 'Nwb', given
ithat 'Nv[lJ' is assumed to be true, it is
assumed to be valid to infer 'Nvau?-tui'.)
4. Replace Od by the Od shown below.
Od: Ow =df WNwV.('It is obligatory that w' is equal to
by definition 'not- w weakly implies
there is a violation'.)
The relationship between entailment ('T' of LS6) and weak impli-
cation ('W' of LS7) can be made more evident by adding the following
definition to LS7:
Td: Tvw =df LWvw.
('v entails w' is equal to by definition
'it is logically necessary (in the S4
sense) that v weakly implies w'.)
The entailment concept of LS7, thus defined, is exactly the same con-
cept of if-then as the entailment concept of LS6. It is of some interest
that 'W' is related to 'T in the way that 'C' is related -to 'LC' (of S4):
TVW. --** Wvw.. L( . . . Wvw. --**Tvw.
LCvw --** Cvw. L( ... Cvw) --** LCvw.
In LS7 the concept of legal obligation leads to the following happy
results:
(26) Op --o LOp,
(27) --** OWOpp.
Therefore, (P2) and (P5) are fulfilled. However,
19741
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(28) p -- ** OPp.40
40. The evidence for (26) is only the empirical kind
Proofs of (27) and (28) are shown below as DR9 and DR1O.












DR1O/LS71 p, -** OPp1
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This means that (P4) is not fulfilled. It is, however, the only one of
the six requisite properties that the legal obligation concept of LS7 fails
to have. In LS8 that last flaw is eliminated.
8. Logical System LS8
In each of the seven systems considered so far as possible candidates
for use in defining the concept of obligation there has been at least one
flaw in terms of the six criteria being used to evaluate the adequacy of
proposed definitions of obligation. This is summarized in Table I
below where the asterisks (*) indicate the unsatisfactory properties of
the definition of obligation in each of the seven systems.
TABLE 1
LS1 LS2 LS3 LS4 LS5 LS6 LS7
PI * * *
P2 *
P3 * * * * *
P4 * *
P5 * * * *
P6
• = definition of obligation is
unsatisfactory in this respect
One system that satisfactorily fulfills the six criteria being used
possesses all the complexity of LS7-and then some more. This sys-
tem, LS8, defines obligation in terms of still another concept of if-then,
namely, what here shall be called 'natural implication.' Natural impli-
cation, in -turn, is defined in -terms of natural necessity and genuine
implication, while natural necessity is defined in terms of the laws of
nature and genuine implication. Genuine implication is a variant of
if-then that is slightly weaker than weak implication. It is like Weak
implication in every respect except that double negation introduction
holds for some but not all of the expressions in the system that defines
genuine implication.
The ba.is of Logical System LS8 is as follows;
1974]
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Variables




* . Logical Sum -aUb
Logical
Difference a-b
Constants Z V1 V 2 V8...
Connectives KGANBRLM
Meta-Variables e f f3 f4
WFFs U V W W4 W5 ...
FORMATION RULES
FR1 If -a formula is a sentence variable or a constant, then
it is a WF.
FR2 If formulas e and f are WFFs, then
(a) so are Kef, Gef, and Aef, and
(b) ' so are Bf, Rf, Lf, Mf, and Nf.
FR3 * If a formula is not a WFF by virtue of one of the
above rules, then it is not a WFF.
TRANSFORMATION RuLES
Name of Rule Statement of Rule
Ko': KVWa --* Va, Wa.
Where 'a' indicates the set of numerical
subscripts in 'Kvw' that is carried
along to 'v' and 'w'. (From 'Kvwa'(i.e., 'v and w'), it is assumed to be
valid to infer 'v.' and it is assumed to
be valid to infer 'wa'.)
[Vol. 48:428
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Ki': Va, Wa --* KVWa.
where 'a' indicates -that the set of nu-
merical subscripts on 'v' and 'w' must
be identical and that the same set of
subscripts is carried along to 'Kvw'.
(From 'v' and 'wa', it is assumed to
be valid to infer 'Kvwv' (i.e., 'v and
W') .)
Go': GVWa, Vb --* WaUb.
where 'a' and 'b' indicate that the sets
of numerical subscripts on 'Gvw' and
'v' may be different and 'aUb' indi-
cates that the set of subscripts carried
along to 'w' is the logical sum of 'a'
and 'b'. (From 'Gvwa' (i.e., 'v genu-
inely implies w') and 'vb', it is assumed
to be valid to infer 'waub'.)
G oGi': G(vttm: ... w) --* Gvw.-(ii.
where '[i]' indicates a numerical sub-
script assigned to supposition 'v' which
is distinct from the numerical subscript
assigned to any other supposition, 'a'
is a set of subscripts which contains
'[i]' and 'a-[i]' is a set of subscripts
comprised of those in 'a with '[i]'
deleted. (From the derivability in a
G-restricted subordinate proof of 'wa',
given that 'v[i]' is assumed to be true,
it is assumed to be valid to infer
'Gvw-[i]' (i.e., 'v genuinely implies
w') .)
G()P: wa --* Gvi:... w.), GO ... w.).
where 'a' indicates the set of numerical
subscripts on 'w' that is carried along
on reiteration into a G-restricted sub-
ordinate proof and '[i]' indicates a
numerical subscript assigned to suppo-
sition 'v' which is distinct from the
numerical assigned to any other sup-
position. (From 'wa', it is assumed
to be valid in a G-restricted subordi-
nate proof to infer 'w', given that
'Viii' is assumed to be true, and it is
assumed to be valid in a G-restricted
subordinate proof to infer 'w.)
1974]
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GoNo': Gvw., Nwb --* Nvub.
where 'a' and 'b' indicate that the sets
of numerical subscripts on 'Gvw' and
'Nw' may be different and 'aUb' indi-
cates that the set of subscripts carried
along to 'Nv' is the logical sum of 'a'
and 'V'. (From 'Gvw.' (i.e., 'v genu-
inely implies w') and 'Nwb' (i.e., 'not
w'), it is assumed to be valid to infer
'Nvzm' (i.e., 'not v').)
G ()oNi': G(vw: • . . wa, NWb) --* Nvarb-tu.
where 'a' and 'b' indicate that the sets
of numerical subscripts on 'w' and
'Nw" may be different, '[i]' indicates a
numerical subscript assigned to suppo-
sition 'v' which is distinct from the nu-
merical subscript assigned to any other
supposition and is contained in both
'a' and 'b', and 'aUb-[i]' indicates that
the set of subscripts carried along to
'Nv' is comprised of those in 'aUb' with
'[i]' deleted. (From the derivability in
a G-restricted subordinate proof of 'w.'
and 'NWb', given that 'Nvnj' is assumed
to be true, it is assumed to be valid to
infer 'Nvaub-Eo'.)
Rp': Wa -* Wa.
(From 'w.', it is assumed to be valid to
infer 'wa'.)
AoNKi': Avw --* NKNvNw.
(From 'Avwa' (i.e., 'v or w'), it is
assumed to be valid to infer 'NKN-
vNwa' (i.e., '(not'v and not w)'.)
NKoAi': NKNvNw --* Avwa.
(From 'NKNvNw.' (i.e., 'not (not v
and not w)'), it is assumed to be
valid to infer 'Avwa' (i.e., 'v or w').)
KoAi2': KuAvwa --* AKuvw.
(From 'KuAvwa' (i.e., 'u and (v or
w)'), it is assumed to be valid to infer
'AKuvwa' (i.e., '(u and v) or w').)
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NNo': NNWa -- * wa.
(From 'NNw' (i.e., 'not not w'), it is
assumed to be valid to infer 'w,'.)
Ai': wa -* Avwa, Awva.
(From 'wa', it is assumed to be valid to
infer 'Avw' (i.e., 'v or w') and to be
valid to infer 'Awva' (i.e., 'w or v').)
KoNNKi': Kvw. --* NNKvwa.
(From 'Kvwa' (i.e., 'v and w'), it is
assumed to be valid to infer 'NNKvw.'
(i.e., 'not not v-and-w').)
Lo': Lwa -* Wa.
(From 'Lwa' (i.e., 'it is logically neces-
sary that w'), it is assumed to be valid
to infer 'wa'.)
LOoLi': L( ... wa) -- * Lw..
(From an L-restricted subordinate
proof that has 'w.' as an item that is
not a supposition, it is assumed to be
valid to infer 'Lw' (i.e., 'it is logically
necessary that w').)
LoR(L)i': Lwa -* R(vm: ... Lw.),
R(... Lw.).
where 'a' indicates the set of numerical
subscripts on 'Lw' that is carried along
upon reiteration into an R-restricted
subordinate proof and '[i]' indicates a
numerical subscript assigned to suppo-
sition 'v' which is distinct from the
numerical subscript assigned to any
other supposition. (From 'Lw.' (i.e.,
'it is logically necessary that w'), it is
assumed to be valid in an R-restricted
subordinate proof to infer 'Lw', given
that 'vm' is assumed to be true, and it
is assumed -to be valid in an R-re-
stricted subordinate proof to infer
'LW'.)
LoLNNi': Lwa -- * LNNw.
(From 'Lw' (i.e., 'it is logically neces-
sary that w'), it is assumed to be valid
to infer 'LNNwa' (i.e., 'it is logically
necessary that not not w').)
1974]
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MoNLNi': Mw.--* NLNwa.
(From 'Mwa' (i.e., 'it is logically pos-
sible that w'), it is assumed to be valid
to infer 'NLNw' (i.e., 'it is not log-
ically necessary that not w').)
NLNoMi': NLNw - Mw..
(From 'NLNwa' (i.e., 'it is not log-
ically necessary that not w'), it is
assumed to be valid to infer 'Mw'
(i.e., 'it is logically possible that w').)
GoNBNi': GZw. --* NBNw.
(From 'GZwa' (i.e., 'the laws of na-
ture41 genuinely imply that w'), it is
assumed to be valid to infer 'NBNwa'
(i.e., 'it is not naturally possible that
not w').)
KIui': W -- * YVIKZw..
(From 'w', it is assumed to be valid to
infer 'MKZwa' (i.e., 'it is logically pos-
sible for both the laws of nature and
w to be true').)
MKoNGi': MKZwa --* NGZNw..
(From 'MKZw' (i.e., 'it is logically
possible for both the laws of nature and
w to be true'), it is assumed to be valid
to infer 'NGZNwa' (i.e., 'it is not so
that -the laws of nature genuinely imply
that not w').)
RoGi': Rwa--* GZwa.
(From 'Rwa' (i.e., 'it is naturally neces-
sary that w'), it is assumed to be validt
to infer 'GZwa' (i.e., 'the laws of nature
(Z) genuinely imply that w').)
GoRi': GZw. --* Rw.
(From 'GZw"' (i.e., 'the laws of nature
genuinely imply -that w'), it is assumed
to be valid to infer 'Rw2 ' (i.e., 'it is
naturally necessary that w').)
41. See F. FrrcH, SYMOLiC LooIC: AN INTRODUCTION 76-77 (1952), for a
discussion of the sense in which the idea of laws of nature is used here and its rela-
tionship to the concept of logical necessity.







R( ... wa) --* Rw..
(From an R-restricted subordinate
proof that has 'wa' as an item that is
not a supposition, it is assumed to be
valid to infer 'Rwa' (i.e., 'it is naturally
necessary that w').)
Rw.--* NNRwa.
(From 'Rwa' (i.e., 'it is naturally nec-
essary that w'), it is assumed to be
valid to infer 'NNRwa' (i.e., 'it is not
not naturally necessary that w').)
RWa.--* R(vti: . .. Rw.),
R(... Rwa).
where 'a' indicates the set of numerical
subscripts on 'Rw' that is carried along
upon reiteration into an R-restricted
subordinate proof and '[i]' indicates a
numerical subscript assigned to sup-
position 'v' which is distinct from the
numerical subscript assigned to any
other supposition. (From 'Rwa' (i.e.,
'it is naturally necessary that w'), it is
assumed to be valid in an R-restricted
subordinate proof -to infer 'Rwa', given
that 'vi' is assumed to be true, and it
is assumed to be valid in an R-
restricted subordinate proof to infer
'Rw'.)
Bwa --* MIKZWa.
(From 'Bwa' (i.e., 'it is naturally pos-
sible that w'), it is assumed to be valid
to infer 'MKZwa' (i.e., 'it is logically
possible that both the laws of nature
and w are true').)
YjKZw. -- *: BW.
(From 'MKZwa' (i.e., 'it is logically
possible that both -the laws of nature
and w are true'), it is assumed to be
valid to infer 'Bw,' (i.e., 'it is naturally
possible that w').)
MNV.
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Z.
(The laws of nature are true.)
DEFINITIONS
The same as in LS6.
Ivw =df RGvw.
('v naturally implies w' is equal to by
definition 'it is naturally necessary that
v genuinely implies w'.)
Ow =df INwV.
('It is obligatory that w' is equal to by
definition 'not w naturally implies that
there is a violation'.)
The same as in LS6.
RGod: RG(v: ... ) =df R(G(v: ... ).)
The relationships between the logical concepts and natural con-
cepts considered with respect to which can and cannot be inferred from
each other as formulated in LS8 are summarized in Figure 1.42
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Figure 1
Lwa . * NMNWa
0
























Bw . MKZwa * . NGZNwa * . * NRNw.
0
Mwa * ---- * NLNwa
1974]
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Op, OIpq --** Oq43
Hence, all six of the criteria being used to test the adequacy of a defini-
tion of the concept of obligation are met by '0' as defined in LS8.
With the complex task of adequately defining obligation now taken
care of, there is just one more brief matter to be considered before
turning to the formal definition of RighT-namely, what it means for
something to "be done", to "be done by someone", and to "be done
for someone".
C. DONE, DONE BY, AND DONE FOR
To say that something has been done is an abbreviated way of
making a statement of fact that it is true that a given state of affairs is
43. The evidence in support of the four nonprovability propositions is of the
empirical kind mentioned in note 39. Proofs of '-** OIOpp' and 'Op, OIpq --**
Oq' in LS8 are shown below as T5 and DRI 1. In the proof of T5, the derived rule
ZoGi' is used; the proof of it is also shown below.
ZoGi' I Za -** PPa
1 Z 1 s
2 RGa IZ 2 s
b-Z 2 aRp'
3 RGZZ - 2,RGOoRGi'
4 GZGZZ - 3,RoGi'
5 GZZ 1 4,1,Go'
6 RZ 1 5,GoRi'
7 RGa -2 3 s
bi p 3 a,Rp'
8 RGpp - 7,RGooRGi
9 GZGpp - 8,RoGi'
10 Gpp 1 9,1,Go'
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the case. Similarly, to say that something has been done by person x
is an abbreviated way of stating that responsibility for the fact that a
given state of affairs happens to be the case is ascribed to person x by
virtue of some articulated (or unarticulated) policies. So, too, is
saying that something has been done for x -an abbreviated way of
stating that x is a person on whose behalf a given state of affairs is
the case according to some articulated (or unarticulated) policies.
Because the formal definition of RighT involves such concepts, it will
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DV., IVWb -- * Dwaub.
(From 'Dva' (i.e., 'v has been done')
and 'Ivw,' (i.e., 'v naturally implies
w'), it is assumed 'to be valid to infer
'Dw.Ub' (i.e., 'Dw has been done').)
DRl1/LS8 IOp,_O1pq__-**_Oq________
DRll/LS8 
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D2oIoD2i': D2vxa, IVWb --* D2WXaub.
(From 'D2vx' (i.e., 'v has been done
by x') and 'Ivwb' (i.e., 'v naturally
implies w'), it is assumed to be valid
to infer 'D2 wXub' (i.e., 'w has been
done by x').)
D4oIoD4i': D4vxa, IVWb --* D4WXutb.
(From 'D4vxa' (i.e., 'v has been done
for x') and 'Ivwb' (i.e., 'v naturally
implies w'), it is assumed to be valid
to infer 'D4wx.ub' (i.e., 'w has been
done for x').)
D2oDi': D2wxa --* Dwa.
(From 'D2wxa' (i.e., 'w has been done
by x'), it is assumed to be valid to
infer 'Dwa' (i.e., 'w has been done').)
D4oDi': D4wx --* Dwa.
(From 'D4wa' (i.e., 'w has been done
for x'), it is assumed to be valid to
infer 'Dwa' (i.e., 'w has been done').)
OD2oDNoD2Ni': OD2wxa, DNwb --* D2Nwxub.
(From 'OD2wxa' (i.e., 'it is obligatory
that w be done by x') and 'DNwb'
(i.e., 'not w has been done'), it is
assumed to be valid to infer 'D2Nwxub'




OD4wxa, DNwb --* D4NWxUb.
(From 'OD4wx2' (i.e., 'it is obligatory
that w be done for x') and 'DNwb'
(i.e., 'not w has been done'), it is
assumed to be valid to infer 'D4NwXaVb'
(i.e., 'not w has been done for x').)
D2Nwx, --* ND2wx,.
(From 'D2Nwxa' (i.e., 'not w has been
done by x'), it is assumed to be valid to
infer 'ND2wxa' (i.e., 'it is not so that
w has been done by x').)
D4Nwxa -- * ND4WXa.
(From 'D4wxa' (i.e., 'not w has been
done for x'), it is assumed to be valid
to infer 'ND4wx' (i.e., 'it is not so
-that w has been done for x').)
1974]
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(From 'D2NNwxa' (i.e., 'not not w
has been done by x'), it is assumed
to be valid to infer 'D2wx.' (i.e., 'w has
been done by x').)
D4NNwx. --* D4WXa
(From 'D4NNwx.' (i.e., 'not not w
has been done for x'), it is assumed to
be valid to infer 'D4wx.' (i.e., 'w has
been done for x').)
D2wXa--* D2NNwXa
(From 'D2wxa' (i.e., 'w has been done
by x'), it, is assumed to be valid to
infer 'D2NNwxa' (i.e., 'not not w has
been done by x').)
D4wx. --* D4NNWXa
(From 'D4wx.' (i.e., 'w has been done
for x'), it is -assumed to be valid to
infer 'D4NNwxa' (i.e., 'not not w has
been done for x').)
DEFINITIONS
D24wxy =df K-D2wx-D4wy.
(,w has been done by x for y' is equal
to by definition 'w has been done by
x and w has been done for y'.)
D42wxy =df K-D4wx-D2wy.
('w has been done for x by y' is equal
to -by definition 'w has been done for
x and w has been done by y'.)
RighT-wxy =df OD24wxy.
('y has a right that w with respect to
x' is equal to by definition 'it is
obligatory that w be done by x for
y'.)
DutY-wxy =df OD42wxy.
('y has a duty to w with respect to x' is
equal to by definition 'it is obligatory










('y has a noright that w with respect
to x' is equal to by definition 'it is not
obligatory that w be done by x for
y.)
PrivilegE-wxy =df NOD42Nwxy.
('y has a privilege to w with respect
to x' is equal to by definition 'it is
not obligatory that not w be done for
x by y'.)
These definitions of RighT, DutY, NorighT, and PrivilegE lead
to the relationships specified by Hohfeld as summarized in Figure 2.1'
44. The proofs of the four derived rules proceeding clockwise around Figure 2
are shown below. The proofs of the other four are then trivial. There are also
shown below justification sketches of seven other derived rules in LS8 that are used
in proving the four clockwise Hohfeldian derived rules.
RGOoRGi': RG(v[,]: ... wa) -** RGVWa_[i]
IUVaIVwb -** IUWaub
D24oD42i': D24wxya -* D42wyxa
D42oD24i': D42wxya -* D24wyxa
D42oD42NNi': D42wxya -* D42NNwxya
OoNNOr: Owa -** NNOwa
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Figure 2
It is obligatory that It is obligatory that
w be doneby x for y. w be done for y by x.
(OD24wxy) (OD42wyx)
RighT-wxy ** .... DutY-wyx
(footnote 44 continued)
DutYoN-














































It is not the case -that
it is not obligatory that





It is not the case that it is not
obligatory that it not be the case
that w not be done for y by x.
NorighTi' [ N-PrivilegE-Nwyx, -** N-NorighT-wxy,
1 N-PrivilegE-Npab 1 s
2 Ga NorighT-pba 2 s
b NOD24pba 2 aNorighTd
c G1 OD42NNpab 3 s
2 RG-ND42NNpab-V 3 1,Od,Id
3 RGa ND24pba 4 s
b G1 NV 5 s
2 RG-ND42NNpab-V 3 2,RoR(R)i'
Goi',GOi'
3 G-ND42NNpab-V 3 2,Ro'
4 D42NNpab 35 3,1,GoNo',NNo
5 D42pab 35 4,D42NNoD42i'
6 D24pba 35 5,D42oD24i'
c G-NV-D24pba 3 b,GooGi'
d V 34 c,a,GoNo',NNo'
4 RG-ND24pba-V 3 3,RGOoRGi'
5 OD24pba 3 4,Id,Od
d G-OD42NNpab-OD24pba - c,GOoGi'
e NOD42NNpab 2 d,b,GoNo'
f PrivilegE-Npab 2 ePrivilegEd
3 G-NorighT-pba-PrivilegE-Npab - 2,GOoGi'
4 N-NorighT-pba 1 3,1,GoNo'
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It might seem that it is intuitively more plausible to define privilege
as follows:
privilege-wxy =df NOND42wxy
('y has a privilege to w with respect to x' is equal to by defini-
tion 'it is not obligatory that it not be so that w is done for x
by y-other words, that it is permissible that w be done for
x by y.)
However, such a definition of privilege leads to the relationships sum-
marized in Figure 3, and -the negation of the privilege of y with respect
to x to do not-w would no longer (naturally) imply that y has a
Duty to x to do w.
Figure 3
Right-wxy ** . . * Duty-wxy
* 0
N-NorighT-wxy o ...... *- N-privilege-Nwyx
Hence, -to preserve Hohfeld's notion of the relationship between 'duty'
and 'privilege' it is necessary to define "PrivilegE-wxy' as indicated, if
'DutY-wxy' is defined as indicated.
Further exploration into the Hohfeldian system to formalize the
concepts of Conditional righT and PoweR is beyond the scope of this
article. Formalization of these two concepts and others associated with
them requires introduction of functional calculus as well as the concept
of time. This will be treated in a subsequent article.
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CONCLUSION
The first part of Hohfeld's system of analysis-namely the part that
deals with RightS, DutieS, NorightS, and PrivilegeS-is formalized in
the preceding pages after detailed consideration of the problems involved
in defining ObligatioN, which in turn is used in defining RighT and the
other three Hohfeldian concepts. Six criteria are proposed for testing
the adequacy of any definition of ObligatioN, and it is shown that the
difficulties of most definitions of '0' are linked with how if-then is
formalized in the various logical systems considered. Certainly, one
may wish to add to these criteria and further refine the concept of
ObligatioN, or one may opt for a different outcome with respect to the
six properties explored. The important point is not that a complete
and final stipulation of ObligatioN (and the other concepts that depend
upon it) shall be definitively achieved in this Article, but rather that
the process of carefully arriving at such definitions be illustrated. To
the extent that other efforts are similarly careful, the research endeavors
and analyses of legal scholars can become more cumulative. We would
do well to profit from the experience of the natural sciences in this
respect and ever recall that
a dwarf sitting on the shoulders of a giant can see farther than
the giant.
1974]
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